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Five delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention 
sued to block Lawrence VanDyke’s (“VanDyke”) name from appearing 
on the ballot as a candidate for the Montana Supreme Court, arguing he 
did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements. The Court, in a 4–3 
vote, found VanDyke eligible because Article VII, Section 9(1) of the 
Montana Constitution only requires one be “admitted” to the Montana 
Bar and not “admitted” and on “Active Status” per the Montana Bar By-
Laws.  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 VanDyke was admitted to the Montana Bar in October of 2005. 
From 2007 to 2012, VanDyke voluntarily chose to be on “inactive” 
status with the Montana Bar. On December 8, 2012, VanDyke returned 
to “active” status and filed to run as a candidate for the Montana 
Supreme Court on March 10, 2014. On March 21, 2014, five members of 
the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention filed suit to remove 
VanDyke’s name from the ballot. The complaint alleged VanDyke did 
not meet the minimum requirements for judicial officers, which required 
that one be “admitted to the practice of law for five years.”2 On summary 
judgment, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs. VanDyke 
immediately appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.3 On July 22, 2014, 
by a vote of 4–3, the Court reversed the district court and held VanDyke 
met the eligibility requirements.4  
 
III.  MAJORITY OPINION 
 
Writing for the majority, Justice Baker relied on textual 
construction of Article VII, Section 9(1) and a historical examination of 
the 1972 Constitutional Convention’s adoption of the provision. 
                                         
1 Cross v. VanDyke, 332 P.3d 215 (Mont. 2014). 
2 The full text of the provision reads: “A citizen of the United States who 
has resided in the state two years immediately before taking office is eligible to 
the office of supreme court justice or district court judge if admitted to the 
practice of law in Montana for at least five years p ior to the date of appointment 
or election.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1). 
3 Cross, 332 P.3d at 215. 
4 Id. at 216. 
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Constitutional provisions must be given their plain meaning, and every 
word and clause must be given effect.5 Prior case law held that “the 
qualifications for Supreme Court Justice are dictated solely by the 
Constitution and covered exclusively in Article VII, Section 9.”6 Since 
all members of the Montana Bar, regardless of their status, are 
“admitted,” and Article VII, Section 9(1) only states one must be 
“admitted,” that is the crucial requirement for eligibility. In addition, the 
eligibility requirements for Attorney General specifically require 
candidates have “active” practice, language noticeably bsent from the 
judicial qualifications.7 The Court refused to read an “active” practice 
requirement into the judicial eligibility requirements because it would 
make the constitutional requirements for the Attorney General surplus 
language.8 
 The Court reinforced its conclusion with a historical argument. 
Citing precedent, even if the plain meaning construction is quite clear, if 
any ambiguity remains and the other possible interpretations are 
plausible, the Court looks to legislative history for clarification.9 During 
the Constitutional Convention, the Judiciary Committee developed two 
different proposals. One required candidates be “experienced with the 
law in Montana for at least five years.” The other simply required 
candidates be “admitted to the practice of law for five years.” After 
intense debate, the full convention adopted the current language. The 
Court concluded that the convention’s decision to reject the more 
stringent requirements in favor of a “more elastic and flexible” version 
was compelling.10 Therefore, the Constitution only requires the candidate 
be admitted to the Montana Bar for five years, not on “active” status. 
                                         
5 Id. at 217, 219. 
6 Id. at 217 (citing Reichert v. State, 278 P.3d 455, 476 (Mont. 2012) 
(Justice Nelson’s opinion noted in full that “Article VII, Section 
9(1) contemplates that the qualifications for these offices are dictated solely by 
the Constitution.”)). 
7 Id. at 219 (the full text of Article VI, Section 3(2) reads: “Any person with 
the foregoing qualifications is eligible to the office of attorney general if an 
attorney in good standing admitted to practice law in Montana who has engaged 
in the active practice thereof for at least five years before election.”). 
8 Id. (citing Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dept. of Nat. Resources & 
Conserv., 127 P.3d 394 (Mont. 2005); Keene Corp. v. U.S., 508 U.S. 200, 208 
(1993) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute, but omits it in another . . ., it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)). 
9 Cross, 332 P.3d at 220 (citing Racicot v. Dist. Ct., 794 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 
1990); State v. Gregori, 328 P.3d 1128 (Mont. 2014)). 
10 Cross, 332 P.3d at 220–222. This version was accompanied w th notes 
stating that its strength was in its “its elasticity and flexibility” as well as its 
“force in its clarity.” Id. at 221. 
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IV.  DISSENTING OPINION 
 
The dissent argued that the majority’s textual reading of Article 
VII, Section 9(1) lacks a proper understanding of Article VII, Section 
2(3).11 Article VII, Section 2(3) gives the Supreme Court the power to 
“make rules governing appellate procedure, practice and procedure for 
all other courts, admission to the bar and the conduct of its members.”12 
The Court exercised this power by adopting the Montana Bar By-Laws. 
Therefore, the definition of “admitted to the practice of law” ought to be 
drawn from the By-Laws. VanDyke was prohibited from practicing law 
while he was on inactive status with the Montana Bar. Article VII, 
Section 9(1) requires that VanDyke be “admitted to the practice of law” 
for at least five years. Since he could not practice while on inactive 
status, he is therefore ineligible to serve on the Montana Supreme Court 




This case attempts to resolve a de novo interpretation of a 
constitutional provision. Using Montana’s clear guidel nes for 
interpreting de novo provisions, the majority properly xamines the plain 
language of the text, construes all sections of the document to have 
meaning, and after concluding that there could be some ambiguity in the 
textual construction because both interpretations are plausible, turns to 
the constitutional history for clarification. The majority concluded that 
one view of the history is compelling and uses it to reinforce its textual 
conclusion, but that view overlooks the general ambiguity of the history 
as a whole. This ambiguity could have been easily resolved by adopting 
the Democracy Canon.  
To begin, when interpreting the Constitution, “if possible, effect 
must be given to every section and clause.”14 Interpretation ought not 
                                         
11 Id. at 223 (Cotter, Sandefur, & McLean, JJ., dissenting). 
12 Id. (citing Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(3) (“[The Court] may make rules 
governing appellate procedure, practice and procedure for all other courts, 
admission to the bar and the conduct of its members. Rules of procedure shall be 
subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions following 
promulgation.”)). 
13 Id. at 223–224. 
14 Martien v. Porter, 219 P. 817 (Mont. 1923). This rule has been in place in 
Montana since 1898. Mont. Coal & Coke Co. v. Livingston, 52 P. 780, 780 
(Mont. 1898) (“The principle of construction, as applied to a written 
constitution, is that effect must be given, if possible, to the whole instrument and 
to every section and clause.”); Kottel v. State, 60 P.3d 403, 413 (Mont. 2002); 
City of Missoula v. Cox, 196 P.3d 452, 454 (Mont. 2008). 
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“create surplus language”15 and the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution is “determined from the plain language of the words 
used.”16 
The judicial requirements of Article VII, Section 9(1) are: 
 
A citizen of the United States who has resided in the 
state two years immediately before taking office is 
eligible to the office of supreme court justice or district 
court judge if admitted to the practice of law in Montana 
for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or 
election.17 
 
Article VII, Section 2(3) also clearly gives the Court the authority to 
make rules regarding “admission to the bar and the conduct of its 
members.”18 Further, the requirements for the Attorney General note: 
 
Any person with the foregoing qualifications is eligible 
to the office of attorney general if an attorney in good 
standing admitted to practice law in Montana who has
engaged in the active practice thereof for at least five 
years before election.19 
 
First, an interpretation that gives effect to each cause without 
creating surplus language would find that there is no “active” 
requirement for judicial officers. The language in the Attorney General 
requirements is very similar to that for judicial officers, but it has several 
modifiers that add significant meaning not present in the court eligibility 
requirements. The Attorney General qualifications add “good standing” 
and “active” to the requirements. To construe both clauses to have 
meaning with no surplus language, one must conclude that there is no 
“active” requirement for judicial officers.  
Second, the plain language of the provisions in question force 
Article VII, Section 9(1) to constrain how Article VII, Section 2(3) is 
applied to the eligibility requirements of judicial officers. In Section 2(3), 
                                         
15 Kottel, 60 P.3d at 413; Hawley v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conserv., 993 P.2d 
677, 679–680 (Mont. 2000). Montana applies the rules of statutory construction 
to constitutional construction as well. Keller v. Smith, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006 
(Mont. 1976); Willems v. State, 325 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Mont. 2014) (“When 
resolving disputes of constitutional construction, we apply the rules of statutory 
construction and give a broad and liberal interpretation to the Constitution.”). 
16 Willems, 325 P.3d at 1208; See also In re Pet. of McCabe, 544 P.2d 825, 
828 (Mont. 1975); Cashman v. Vickers, 233 P.897, 899 (Mont. 1924). 
17 Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1). 
18 Id. at art. VII, § 2(3). 
19 Id. at art. VI, § 3(2). 
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the Court is given the authority only over “admission” and “conduct” of 
the Montana Bar.20 Section 9(1) requires one be “admitted to the practice 
of law.” “Admission” and “admitted” are both derived from “admit.” The 
Court has consistently found that “[a]ll of the provisions of the 
Constitution bearing upon the same subject matter ar  to receive 
appropriate attention and be construed together.”21 Therefore, similar 
words must be construed similarly. The plain meaning of “admit” is to 
“allow to join a organization” or “allow to share in a privilege.”22 Since 
Article VII, Section 9(1) only requires “admission,” the Court’s authority 
over “admission” is all that is implicated when recon iling the 
requirements. The Court has exercised this authority by prescribing how 
one is “admitted” to the Montana Bar: by passing the Montana Bar and 
the required character and fitness examinations. The majority, therefore, 
correctly concludes the text clearly indicates no “active” requirement.  
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that there is potentially 
some ambiguity in its interpretation because the appellee’s construction 
is plausible.23 As such, the majority then examines the 1972 Montana 
Constitutional Convention notes for clarification. Here, the majority 
concludes that the convention’s rejection of the more stringent proposal 
for the judiciary language is compelling enough to support their textual 
reading.24 This, however, does not fully address the events of the 
constitutional convention. 
Article VII’s enactment history reflects a somewhat mixed 
constitutional intent that could be construed to require some sort of 
“active” legal practice in Montana or not. Depending on the emphasis 
given to the source, three different arguments can be made regarding the 
meaning of Article VII, Section 9(1). Two resolve in favor of an “active” 
requirement and one does not. 
First, the only full convention commentary regarding Article VII, 
Section 9(1)’s adoption implies “active” practice in Montana. Delegate 
Berg commented during the floor debate: 
 
It was the belief of the committee . . . that it takes 
experience in the courtroom, it takes experience in the 
actual practice in Montana in order to understand the 
procedures that we use, and that it would be harmful to 
the carrying out of justice in our courts if we had people 
                                         
20 Id. at art. VII, § 2(3). 
21 Jones v. Judge, 577 P.2d 846, 849 (Mont. 1978); Hilger v. Moore, 182 P. 
477 (Mont. 1919). 
22 The New Oxford American Dictionary 21 (Erin McKean ed., Oxford U. 
Press 2005). 
23 Cross, 332 P.3d at 220. 
24 Id. at 222. 
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on the bench who were not intimately familiar not only 
with Montana substantive law, but more especially with 
procedural law, and we felt very strongly that one f the 
most significant qualifications would be actual trial 
practice in court.25 
 
Using Delegate Berg’s comments as a guide to read the text of the 
provision, the five year requirement becomes the practical outworking of 
the goal: intimate familiarity with Montana law developed by actual legal 
practice. If one can only practice law in Montana while on an “active” 
status with the Montana Bar, then that goal is only met in that manner.  
Second, the official Voter Guide distributed to allMontanans 
prior to the ratification of the constitution implies there is an “active” 
practice requirement.26 Some have argued that since Montana voters 
were the ones who actually placed the 1972 Constitution into law, not the 
delegates to the convention, the information they used to decide is what 
ought to be referenced for interpretation.27 Regarding Article VII, 
Section 9(1), the Voter Guide specifically notes:  
 
Revises 1889 constitution by making residency 
requirements for candidates for district court judgeship 
the same as for supreme court and deleting age 
requirements. Requirement for five years of law practice 
new.28 
 
The Voter Guide’s statement, “Requirement for five y ars of law 
practice new,” provides the intent for “admitted to the practice of law.” 
“Law practice,” therefore, is the interpretation of “admitted.” This would 
imply that those practicing law are those allowed do so per the Montana 
Bar. The Court has authority over the “conduct” of the Bar and enacted 
the rules for practice.29 These rules would be the appropriate test for 
determining eligibility and, according to them, one must be on “active” 
status. 
Finally, the procedural history of Article VII, Section 9(1), 
which the majority finds conclusive, concludes that there is no 
requirement for “active” practice. During the Convetion, the Judiciary 
                                         
25 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcript vol. 
V, 1119–1120 (1981) (hereinafter Montana Constitutional Convention).  
26 Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana: Official Text with 
Explanation 13 (1972) (hereinafter Voter Guide).  
27 Fritz Snyder, The Right to Know and the Right to Participate in Montana, 
66 Mont. L. Rev. 297, 300–301 (2005); Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The 
Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 15 (Greenwood Press 2001). 
28 Voter Guide, supra n. 26, at 13. 
29 Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(3). 
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Committee submitted two proposals for the language of Article VII. 30 
The majority proposal passed out of committee on a five-to-four vote, 
but the minority proposal was the version actually enacted in the 
constitution.31 The majority proposal had much more specific eligibility 
requirements for judicial officers.32 It required they be “admitted to 
practice law in Montana and experienced with the law in Montana for at 
least five years immediately prior to filing for orbeing appointed to the 
position of justice.”33 The majority proposal was rejected for the more 
elastic and flexible minority proposal.34 This clear rejection of the very 
specific requirements demonstrates intent to not have those specific 
requirements. As such, if one weighs the procedural history as providing 
the overall intent of the convention, there is no “active” practice 
requirement in Article VII, Section 9(1). 
Depending on the weight given to the source of intent, the 
outcome varies. The majority finds one of the readings compelling and 
uses it to enforce its very strong textual argument. There is, however, no 
fully clean answer from the history. At minimum, this injects some 
ambiguity to the historical argument, which could have been resolved 
with the Democracy Canon.  
 
VI.  THE DEMOCRACY CANON: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
 
The court reached a sound textual construction, but admitted 
there could be some ambiguity and turned to Article VII’s rancorous 
history for clarification. As noted above, there is not much historical 
clarity: both sides have valid interpretations. As briefed by VanDyke, the 
Democracy Canon would have been an excellent resolution to this 
ambiguity.35 The Democracy Canon, as articulated by Richard Hasen, i  
an interpretative canon that has been used in statecourts since 1885 to 
resolve questions of either voter or candidate eligibi ty issues during an 
election.36 Although never adopted in Montana, use of the Democracy 
Canon has been widespread throughout the nation.37 Since Cross v. 
                                         
30 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 25, at vol. I, 537–539. 
31 Id. at vol. I, 537–539. 
32 Id. at vol. I, 495. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at vol. I, 514 (“This minority proposed Judicial Article is truly a viable 
cornerstone for the establishment and operation of the courts of Montana. Its 
elasticity and flexibility are its strength; its clarity lends it force.”). 
35 The Democracy Canon was fully briefed by VanDyke in this case and 
presented a ripe opportunity for the Court to adopt the one aspect of the canon.  
36 Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 76–77 
(2009). 
37 Id. Notably, Hasen cites only one Montana case: Stackpole v. Hallahan, 
40 P. 80 (Mont. 1895). In Stackpole, a political party made a technical error in 
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VanDyke involves only a candidate eligibility question, analysis of the 
Democracy Canon and its applicability will be limited to that area.  
The canon has typically been used when election statutes are 
ambiguous.38 The general principle is that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit 
the citizen in his exercise of the right of suffrage should be liberally 
construed in his favor.”39 The purpose of the canon is: (1) to expand 
opportunities for registered voters to vote and have their votes counted 
(voter access and enfranchisement); and, to a lesser ext nt, (2) to 
promote competitive elections by including more candidates or parties on 
the ballot (electoral competitiveness).40 “Liberal construction of election 
laws serves ‘to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the 
electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties 
to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow voters 
a choice on Election Day.’”41 
The 2008 Alaska case of Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos42 is 
a good example of the Democracy Canon’s application o candidate 
eligibility issues. Municipal statutes only allowed three consecutive 
terms on the Anchorage Assembly. Dick Traini was elect d mid-term as 
an assemblyman, serving the last year of a full, three-year cycle and then 
was elected to two more full terms. Traini then declared his candidacy to 
run for another term. A local doctor filed for injuctive relief to declare 
that Traini’s “partial-term” was considered a term for counting the 
number of consecutive terms he could serve and therefor  was ineligible 
to run again. The trial court found the “partial-term” counted as a term 
                                                                                      
appointment of a replacement nomination. The Court found that the error was 
not substantial and ruled the nomination valid. I  Further examination of 
Montana cases demonstrates no specific adoption of the Democracy Canon. 
Some courts have found the Democracy Canon to be a “rule of thumb” and 
others have required their state legislatures to clearly intend to disregard the 
canon to remove its use. Id. at 88. 
38 Id. at 87–88. 
39 Id. at 76 (citing Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 509 (1885)). 
40 Id. at 84. 
41 Id. at 77 (citing Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991)). 
Some have criticized the use of substantive canons because they “load the dice” 
towards a particular outcome. However, Hasen defends the use of the 
Democracy Canon on several grounds. First, it enforces an under enforced 
constitutional right. Enforcing the right to vote under equal rights protections 
can be difficult and unwieldy, but the Democracy Canon serves in that stead by 
enforcing statutory provisions in favor of voting ri hts. Second, the Democracy 
Canon serves as a preference-eliciting mechanism for the legislature. 
Legislatures will respond if they don’t like it and not respond if they approve. 
Finally, it serves as a guiding principle that creates stability when election 
supervisors are partisan officials. Id at 77–105. 
42 Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2008). 
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and that he was ineligible to run. The case was appe led to the Alaska 
Supreme Court,43 where the court concluded: 
 
In our view there is a presumption in favor of candidate 
eligibility. In cases where there is a statutory ambiguity 
as to whether or not a candidate is eligible to run for 
office, the statute should be construed in favor of 
eligibility, so long as it may be reasonably so read.44 
 
The court reasoned that both parties’ views of the s atute were reasonable 
interpretations and therefore, since the statute was ambiguous, it ought to 
be construed to allow eligibility.45  
Applied to the instant case, the Democracy Canon would clearly 
find VanDyke eligible to run. Article VII, Section 9(1) could be 
considered ambiguous for several reasons: (1) a lower court concluded 
one way and the Supreme Court another way on the text and history; and 
(2) the mixed constitutional history. Per the Democracy Canon, 
ambiguous statutes are construed in favor of eligibility and, like Mjos, 
VanDyke would be allowed to run.  
The Democracy Canon would benefit Montanans in several 
ways. First, it would decrease the negative effect of lawsuits over 
candidate eligibility. The Secretary of State screens to determine if a 
candidate is eligible to run.46 VanDyke began to campaign after receiving 
the Secretary of State’s certification, only be to be stopped by litigation. 
The question surrounding his candidacy was legitimate, but it also cost a 
candidate, in a time sensitive race, months of campaign time and press 
regarding his possible ineligibility while the issue was litigated. The 
courts moved as fast as possible, indeed incredibly fast, but the litigation 
surely had a negative effect on his campaign. The Democracy Canon 
would have minimized the interference.  
Second, the Democracy Canon would serve to remove sme 
partisan election fights from judiciary. Elections have always been 
cantankerous, but the judiciary has become increasingly involved in 
recent years. The 2000 Presidential election is a perfect example. 
Candidates and advocates rush to the courts for injunctions, 
invalidations, and other legal remedies. Sometimes the resulting 
decisions change the outcome of an election. The instant case marks the 
Montana judiciary’s entry into candidate eligibility questions. Whether 
right or wrong, these injections seem to cast a pall over the elections 
themselves. Those who lose in court and their supporters always believe 
                                         
43 Id. at 942. 
44 Id. at 943. 
45 Id. 
46 Mont. Code Ann. § 31–1–201 (2013). 
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the court was partisan and politicized. This is no less true for the instant 
case. The plaintiffs are supporters of VanDyke’s opponent, Justice Mike 
Wheat, and VanDyke’s removal would remove Justice Wheat’s only 
challenger. Regardless of the outcome, one side would have viewed the 
court as partisan. 
Implementation of the Democracy Canon, with a hefty 
explanation of its purpose and reasoning, could have resolved the current 
issue in a manner that favors electoral competition and would have set 
the stage for full adoption of the Democracy Canon in Montana. Such a 
decision would have helped reduce future judicial involvement in 
elections. Under such precedent, candidates and advoc tes would realize 
the Montana Supreme Court will construe ambiguous texts in favor of 
the candidate, the voter, and the ballot and it would keep elections where 
they belong: in the hands of the electorate. 
 
 
